The package "jquery-validation" may be vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) involving its handling of regular expressions.
We have not identified an attack scenario affecting CiviCRM, but the update appears to be a safe and sensible precaution.
This page lists all security advisories since June 2013. For older security advisories see this post. Security release announcements (starting with v4.2) are also listed here.
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The package "jquery-validation" may be vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) involving its handling of regular expressions.
We have not identified an attack scenario affecting CiviCRM, but the update appears to be a safe and sensible precaution.
Select2 is an auto-complete widget. In multiple places where CiviCRM uses Select2, it was vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
(We believe that exploiting this requires that both the attacker and the victim have a high-level of access to the same CiviCRM deployment.)
A problematic code pattern was found in ~8 places. Any of these places could be vulnerable a SQL injection (SQLI) attack. However, it is believed that most or all have mitigating factors that prevent exploits.
Users with access APIv3 or APIv4 via any medium (including web-browser) may be able to execute an SQL injection (SQL) attack.
KCFinder provides a file-management dialog for CKEditor 4. It included two vulnerabilities:
Template authors can perform remote code execution (RCE) with a specially crafted call to the {math} function.
(This issue was identified as part of a general audit of Smarty v2, CIVI-PSA-2023-01.)
The "dompdf" library has a vulnerability which allows remote code execution. It may be exploited by some backend users.
The CiviCRM-WordPress module includes a "Quick Add" widget that can be used to trick another user into executing arbitrary HTML and Javascript.
(This vulnerability is similar to "stored cross-site scripting". However, exploiting it requires the backend privilege access CiviCRM, so it can only be exploited by internal users.)
CiviCRM's file-upload mechanism includes a guard to limit the range of accepted file-types. However, the guard is too relaxed - in some configurations, this enables a less-privileged data-administrator to execute arbitrary code.
Asset Builder allows CiviCRM and its extensions to generate dynamic assets. A vulnerability allowed third-parties to trick it into generating assets with unintended inputs.
Exploiting this vulnerability depends on several details (e.g. the asset data-types, input-parameters, and web-domain policies). For the specific assets and configurations that we tested, attacks were substantively constrained by the browsers' "Same Origin Policy". However, other assets and other configurations could be impacted more severely.
CiviEvent included a vector for reflected cross-site-scripting (XSS) attacks.
The "Help" subsystem did not sufficiently validate the location/origin of its source files. If combined with a web-based upload tool, this could allow a user to execute arbitrary code.
With CiviCRM's standard upload tools, exploiting this vulnerability requires permission "administer CiviCRM". However, other upload tools (such as CMS plugins) could provide other attack vectors.
A vulnerability in processing APIv3 AJAX requests could allow a malicious request to bypass permission checks.
The "dompdf" library has a vulnerability which allows remote code execution. It may be exploited by some backend users.
CKEditor had a vulnerability that could allow execution of Javascript code.
The exact degree of exploitability for CiviCRM has not been determined.
jQuery UI v1.12 included multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
It has not been demonstrated that CiviCRM specifically is exploitable. However, it is possible that third-party extensions could use jQuery UI in a vulnerable fashion.
This is not a security vulnerability. It is a mitigation to protect against misconfiguration.
CiviCRM includes a large number of configurable permissions. Administrators may assign these permissions to various users and roles. This is powerful functionality that accommodates diverse needs, but it provides the opportunity for misconfiguration.
Misconfigurations may arise for a few reasons, such as:
When importing "Participant" records for CiviEvent, some inputs were not suitably escaped.
When accessing the Contribution View page insufficient permission checking was occurring which meant that if you knew the url and had the access CiviCRM permission you would be able to view contribution information that you shouldn't have.
CiviCRM includes a rich text editing component, CKEditor, which recently released a security update (v4.16.2). This update addresses 3 security issues.
We expect that these vulnerabilities cannot be meaningfully exploited by automated bots or crawlers - but they may be exploitable with modest social-engineering. Thus, we advise upgrading (or using one of the alternative solutions below).
Some permissions were not being checked adequately before returning results from the CiviCRM APIv4. This did not affect everyday use of CiviCRM, but an attacker could potentially exploit this to bypass security checks and read private data from the database. To date there are no known sites that have been compromised due to this bug. APIv3 was not affected.
(This is a public service announcement related to security functionality. It does not detail an exploitable vulnerability. Rather, we wish to advise administrators and developers about an on-going change to improve security.)
CiviCRM v3.1 introduced a helper "CRM_Utils_Crypt" which encrypted the SMTP password. This mechanism is being phased-out circa 5.34 in favor of a more secure mechanism. We will briefly consider the purpose of the mechanism, some of its issues, and the details of the change.
In the Joomla integration, some references to user-account records were not properly sanitized.
CiviCRM's REST API traditionally requires two keys, the "API Key" and the "Site Key". The "Site Key" could potentially be extracted by a "timing attack". In this scenario, an attacker would send many invalid requests, build a statistical profile, and infer the most likely value.
The introduction text on a Personal Campaign Page (PCP) was not properly sanitised prior to display on the Personal Campaign page.